2008
Of Mechanism Design Multiagent Planning
Publication
Publication
Multiagent planning methods are concerned with planning by and for a group of agents. If the agents are self-interested, they may be tempted to lie in order to obtain an outcome that is more rewarding for them. We therefore study the multiagent planning problem from a mechanism design perspective, showing how to incentivise agents to be truthful. We prove that the well-known truthful VCG mechanism is not always truthful in the context of optimal planning, and present a modification to fix this. Finally, we present some (domain-dependent) poly-time planning algorithms using this fix that maintain truthfulness in spite of their non-optimality.
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| doi.org/10.3233/978-1-58603-891-5-423, hdl.handle.net/1765/131490 | |
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van der Krogt, R., de Weerdt, M. M., & Zhang, Y. (2008). Of Mechanism Design Multiagent Planning. doi:10.3233/978-1-58603-891-5-423
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