Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?
De Economist , Volume 167 p. 127- 143
Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate infuence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties infuence decisions with higher probability when their stakes are sufciently large. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information.
|Information collection · Communcation · Interest groups · Decisionmaking|
|Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior (jel D72), Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation (jel D78), Asymmetric and Private Information (jel D82), Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents: Other (jel H39)|
|Organisation||Erasmus School of Social and Behavioural Sciences|
Sharif, Z., & Swank, O.H. (2019). Do More Powerful Interest Groups Have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?. De Economist, 167, 127–143. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/132466