2022-05-30
Cognition and Incentives in Cooperatives
Publication
Publication
ERIM report series research in management Erasmus Research Institute of Management
We extend the results of Feng and Hendrikse (2012) by investigating the relationship between cognition and incentives in cooperatives versus investor-owned firms (IOFs) in a multi-tasking principal-agent model. The principal chooses the incentive intensity as well as the precision of monitoring, while the agent chooses the activities. We establish that a cooperative is uniquely efficient when either the synergy between the upstream and downstream activities or the knowledgeability of the members regarding the cooperative enterprise is sufficiently high.
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| hdl.handle.net/1765/137124 | |
| ERIM Report Series Research in Management | |
| ERIM report series research in management Erasmus Research Institute of Management | |
| Organisation | Erasmus Research Institute of Management |
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Wei, A., & Hendrikse, G. (2022). Cognition and Incentives in Cooperatives (No. ERS-2022-007-ORG). ERIM report series research in management Erasmus Research Institute of Management. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/137124 |
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