This paper connects theory of learning with theory of governance, in the context of inter-firm relations. It recognizes fundamental criticism of transaction cost economics (TCE), but preserves elements from that theory. The theory of governance used incorporates learning and trust. The paper identifies two kinds of relational risk: hold-up and spillover. For the governance of relations, i.e. the control of relational risk, it develops a box of instruments which includes trust, next to instruments derived and adapted from TCE. These instruments are geared to problems that are specific to learning in interaction between firms. They also include additional roles for go-betweens.

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Erasmus Research Institute of Management
hdl.handle.net/1765/145
ERIM Report Series Research in Management
Erasmus Research Institute of Management

Nooteboom, B. (2001). Learning and Governance in Inter-Firm Relations (No. ERS-2001-71-ORG). ERIM Report Series Research in Management. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/145