2009-12-01
Which preferred providers are really preferred? Effectiveness of insurers' channeling incentives on pharmacy choice
Publication
Publication
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics , Volume 9 - Issue 4 p. 347- 366
Efficient contracting of health care requires effective consumer channeling. Little is known about the effectiveness of channeling strategies. We study channeling incentives on pharmacy choice using a large scale discrete choice experiment. Financial incentives prove to be effective. Positive financial incentives are less effective than negative financial incentives. Channeling through qualitative incentives also leads to a significant impact on provider choice. While incentives help to channel, a strong status quo bias needs to be overcome before consumers change pharmacies. Focusing on consumers who are forced to choose a new pharmacy seems to be the most effective strategy.
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doi.org/10.1007/s10754-009-9055-5, hdl.handle.net/1765/15562 | |
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics | |
Organisation | Erasmus Research Institute of Management |
Boonen, L., Schut, E., Donkers, B., & Koolman, X. (2009). Which preferred providers are really preferred? Effectiveness of insurers' channeling incentives on pharmacy choice. International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 9(4), 347–366. doi:10.1007/s10754-009-9055-5 |