The banks in the Dutch chipcard marker initially agreed on one chipcard system. One system is attractive for companies as well as consumers. Companies, banks, and retailers prevent costs of duplication, while consumers enjoy the benefits of a widespread acceptance of one card and do not face uncertainty regarding the chipcard standard. Two standards could harm the development of the chipcard market. However; Pastbank withdrew from the initial agreement and introduced its own chipcard system in December 1995. This has resulted in a costly battle between the two banking chzpcard standards, duplication costs for retailers, the introduction of a gateway technology in order to establish compatibility for users, and low market acceptance of chipcards. In March 2001, after a struggle of more than five years, the banks decided to return to one chipcard. The rationality of Posibank's decision to withdraw, despite the prospect that everybody may be worse off will be analyzed from the perspective of game theory and the theory regarding standards battles.

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hdl.handle.net/1765/15704
ERIM Article Series (EAS)
International Studies of Management and Organization
Erasmus Research Institute of Management

de Vries, H., & Hendrikse, G. (2001). The Dutch Banking Chipcard Game: Understanding a Battle Between Two Standards. International Studies of Management and Organization, 106–125. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/15704