This PhD dissertation conceptualizes the World Bank Inspection Panel as a mechanism of quasi-judicial review or oversight, aimed at enhancing the accountability and legitimacy of the World Bank – which is conceived as an international institution exercising public power. The author engages in comparative constitutional law analysis, looking towards three non-international constitutional systems (the United States, European Union, and post-Apartheid South Africa) to construct a ‘conceptual model of judicial oversight’ that refl ects the concept’s ‘nature’, ‘effect’, and ‘dynamics’. The author employs this Model to analyze the institutional history and practice of the World Bank Inspection Panel, covering the Panel’s entire institutional lifespan to date. The author concludes that the nature, effect and dynamics of judicial oversight – indeed, the ‘judicial spirit’ – are more alive in this area of public international law than what might be expected.

Inspection Panel, World Bank, accountability and legitimacy of international institutions, judicial oversight, judicialization
E. Hey (Ellen) , R. de Lange (Roel)
Erasmus University Rotterdam
978-90-77596-82-1
hdl.handle.net/1765/16996
Erasmus School of Law

Naudé Fourie, A. (2009, October 16). The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight: In Search of the 'Judicial Spirit' in Public International Law. Erasmus University Rotterdam. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/16996