Causation in the social sciences: Evidence, inference, and purpose
Philosophy of the Social Sciences , Volume 39 - Issue 1 p. 20- 40
All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. gCausal pluralismg is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked.
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Reiss, J.P. (2009). Causation in the social sciences: Evidence, inference, and purpose. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39(1), 20–40. doi:10.1177/0048393108328150