All univocal analyses of causation face counterexamples. An attractive response to this situation is to become a pluralist about causal relationships. gCausal pluralismg is itself, however, a pluralistic notion. In this article, I argue in favor of pluralism about concepts of cause in the social sciences. The article will show that evidence for, inference from, and the purpose of causal claims are very closely linked.

Causation, Evidence, Methodology, Pluralism
dx.doi.org/10.1177/0048393108328150, hdl.handle.net/1765/18395
Philosophy of the Social Sciences
Erasmus School of Philosophy

Reiss, J.P. (2009). Causation in the social sciences: Evidence, inference, and purpose. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 39(1), 20–40. doi:10.1177/0048393108328150