Regulatory disclosure of names of offending companies is increasingly popular as an alternative to traditional command and control regulation. However, the goals and intended effects of disclosure are not always clear. Do regulators wish to increase their transparency, or do they intend to name and shame? This article aims to contribute to a better understanding of the underlying working mechanism of regulatory disclosure of offenders’ names through a case study of the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets’ disclosure policy. It distinguishes two types of disclosure strategies: consumer-oriented, and firm-oriented disclosure strategies. The case study shows that although informing consumers was the primary purpose of disclosure as intended by the Dutch legislature, the purpose in practice has shifted to informing companies about the regulators’ enforcement policy. The nature of the disclosed information makes it unlikely that disclosure adequately prevents financial risk taking by consumers. Instead of empowering consumers, disclosure has been incorporated in a traditional deterrence logic, turning out not to be an example of new governance, but a modern version of command and control enforcement publicity.

disclosure, enforcement, financial market, regulation, reputation
Law & Policy

van Erp, J.G. (2010). Regulatory disclosure of offending companies in the Dutch financial market. Law & Policy, 32(4), 407–433. Retrieved from