Marketing co-operatives (MCs) are analysed from an incomplete contracting perspective. The requirement of the domination of control by the members of a MC is a threat to the survival of a MC in markets where the level of asset specificity at the processing stage of production is increasing. However, a MC may remain an efficient governance structure when the increasing level of asset specificity is compensated for by a sufficient increase in the extent of product differentiation.
|incomplete contracts, marketing cooperatives|
|Production and Organizations (jel D2), Corporate Finance and Governance (jel G3), Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior (jel L2), Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting (jel M), Business Administration: General (jel M10)|
|Erasmus Research Institute of Management|
|ERIM Report Series Research in Management|
|Copyright 2000, G.W.J. Hendrikse, C.P. Veerman, This report in the ERIM Report Series Research in Management is intended as a means to communicate the results of recent research to academic colleagues and other interested parties. All reports are considered as preliminary and subject to possibly major revisions. This applies equally to opinions expressed, theories developed, and data used. Therefore, comments and suggestions are welcome and should be directed to the authors.|
|Organisation||Erasmus Research Institute of Management|
Hendrikse, G.W.J, & Veerman, C.P. (2000). Marketing co-operatives (No. ERS-2000-13-ORG). ERIM Report Series Research in Management. Erasmus Research Institute of Management. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/22