Abstract—Hangzhou subway collapse is the most serious subway construction disaster to date in China. In this article, the management and regulatory questions the collapse raised are focused and a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse is given. By regarding the contractual arrangement as an outcome of a power game of principal-agent, the social causes and the perverse incentives to strategic behaviors of the key players are investigated to explain the particular project outcomes. In the end, some policy suggestions are given for improving the safety performance of subway construction.

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Publisher Delft University of Technology
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1109/INFRA.2010.5679231, hdl.handle.net/1765/22084
Koppenjan, J.F.M, Ma, Y, de Jong, M, & Xi, B. (2010). Perverse incentives and invisible tradeoffs in subway construction in China: a case study of Hangzhou subway collapse. Delft University of Technology. doi:10.1109/INFRA.2010.5679231