Preference reversals have usually been explained by weighted additive models, in which different tasks give rise to different importance weights for the stimulus attributes, resulting in contradictory trade-offs. This article presents a preference reversal of a more extreme nature. Let (10, 5 Migr) denote living 10 years with a migraine for 5 days per week. Many participants preferred (10, 5 Migr) to (20, 5 Migr). However, when asked to equate these two options with a shorter period of good health, they usually demanded more healthy life years for (20, 5 Migr) than for (10, 5 Migr). This preference reversal within a single dimension cannot be explained by different importance weights and suggests irrationalities at a more fundamental level. Most participants did not change their responses after being confronted with their inconsistencies.

experimental psychology, preference reversals
Wolters Kluwer Health (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins a.o.)
hdl.handle.net/1765/23092
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance
Erasmus School of Economics

Stalmeier, P.F.M, Wakker, P.P, & Bezembinder, Th.G.G. (1997). Preference Reversals: Violations of Unidimensional Procedure Invariance. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance (Vol. 23, pp. 1196–1205). Wolters Kluwer Health (Lippincott Williams & Wilkins a.o.). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/23092