True to oneself? Broad and narrow ideas on authenticity in the enhancement debate
Our knowledge of the human brain and the influence of pharmacological substances on human mental functioning is expanding. This creates new possibilities to enhance personality and character traits. Psychopharmacological enhancers, as well as other enhancement technologies, raise moral questions concerning the boundary between clinical therapy and enhancement, risks and safety, coercion and justice. Other moral questions include the meaning and value of identity and authenticity, the role of happiness for a good life, or the perceived threats to humanity. Identity and authenticity are central in the debate on psychopharmacological enhancers. In this paper, I first describe the concerns at issue here as extensively propounded by Carl Elliott. Next, I address David DeGrazia's theory, which holds that there are no fundamental identity-related and authenticity-related arguments against enhancement technologies. I argue, however, that DeGrazia's line of reasoning does not succeed in settling these concerns. His conception of identity does not seem able to account for the importance we attach to personal identity in cases where personal identity is changed through enhancement technology. Moreover, his conception of authenticity does not explain the reason why we find inauthentic values objectionable. A broader approach to authenticity can make sense of concerns about changes in personal identity by means of enhancement technologies.
|Keywords||Authenticity, Autonomy, Cosmetic psychopharmacology, Enhancement, Neuroscience, Personal identity|
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11017-007-9039-8, hdl.handle.net/1765/36782|
|Journal||Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics|
Bolt, L.L.E. (2007). True to oneself? Broad and narrow ideas on authenticity in the enhancement debate. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics (Vol. 28, pp. 285–300). doi:10.1007/s11017-007-9039-8