Does the cue of money lead to selfish, greedy, exploitative behaviors or to fairness, exchange, and reciprocity? We found evidence for both, suggesting that people have both sets of meaningful associations, which can be differentially activated by exposure to clean versus dirty money. In a field experiment at a farmers’ market, vendors who handled dirty money subsequently cheated customers, whereas those who handled clean money gave fair value (Experiment 1). In laboratory studies with economic games, participants who had previously handled and counted dirty money tended toward selfish, unfair practices— unlike those who had counted clean money or dirty paper, both of which led to fairness and reciprocity. These patterns were found with the trust game (Experiment 2), the prisoner’s dilemma (Experiment 4), the ultimatum game (Experiment 5), and the dictator game (Experiment 6). Cognitive measures indicated that exposure to dirty money lowered moral standards (Experiment 3) and reduced positive attitudes toward fairness and reciprocity (Experiments 6–7), whereas exposure to clean money had the opposite effects. Thus, people apparently have 2 contradictory sets of associations (including behavioral tendencies) to money, which is a complex, powerful, and ubiquitous aspect of human social life and cultural organization.

exchange, fairness, greed, money, moral
This research was supported by the Key Program and General Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grants 91124004 and 31171002) and by the 985-3 Research Program of Sun Yat-Sen University (Grant 90026-3284000).
dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0030596, hdl.handle.net/1765/37933
ERIM Article Series (EAS)
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
"Online first publication" on November 5th 2012
Erasmus Research Institute of Management

Yang, Q, Wu, X, Zhou, X, Mead, N.L, Vohs, K.D, & Baumeister, R.F. (2013). Diverging effects of clean versus dirty money on attitudes, values, and interpersonal behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(3), 473–489. doi:10.1037/a0030596