Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis , Volume 47 - Issue 5 p. 1029- 1057
Current attempts to reform financial markets presume that shareholder empowerment benefits shareholders. We investigate the wealth effects associated with the Securities and Exchange Commission’s rule to facilitate director nominations by shareholders. Our results are not in line with shareholder empowerment creating value: The average daily abnormal returns surrounding events that increase (decrease) the probability of the proposal’s passage are significantly negative (positive). Furthermore, given an increase in the probability of the proposal’s passage, firms whose shareholders are more likely to use the rule to nominate directors experience more negative abnormal returns.
|financial markets, shareholders|
|ERIM Top-Core Articles|
|Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis|
|Organisation||Erasmus Research Institute of Management|
Akyol, A, Lim, W.F, & Verwijmeren, P. (2012). Shareholders in the Boardroom: Wealth Effects of the SEC’s Proposal to Facilitate Director Nominations. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 47(5), 1029–1057. doi:10.1017/S0022109012000373