A central question in many debates on paternalism is whether a decision analyst can ever go against the stated preference of a client, even if merely intending to improve the decisions for the client. Using four gedanken-experiments, this paper shows that this central question, so cleverly and aptly avoided by libertarian paternalism (nudge), cannot always be avoided. The four thought experiments, while purely hypothetical, serve to raise and specify the critical arguments in a maximally clear and pure manner. The first purpose of the paper is, accordingly, to provide a litmus test on the readers' stance on paternalism. We thus also survey and organize the various stances in the literature. The secondary purpose of this paper is to argue that paternalism cannot always be avoided and consumer sovereignty cannot always be respected. However, this argument will remain controversial.

Choice inconsistency, Debiasing, Libertarian paternalism, Nudge, Standard gamble
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-013-9375-2, hdl.handle.net/1765/40259
ERIM Top-Core Articles
Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences
Erasmus Research Institute of Management

Li, C, Li, Z, & Wakker, P.P. (2014). If nudge cannot be applied: a litmus test of the readers' stance on paternalism. Theory and Decision: an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision sciences, 76(3), 297–315. doi:10.1007/s11238-013-9375-2