As we move towards constructing narratives regarding the future outlook of global governance, constitutionalisation among them, the hope is that whatever shape this world order takes it will, somehow, forestall or hinder the possibili- ty of a hegemonic order. This article tries to deconstruct the notion of hegemony and claims that as it currently stands it is useless in doing its critical work since every successful nar- rative will end up being hegemonic because it will employ the ‘hegemonic technique’ of presenting a particular value (or value system), a particular viewpoint, as universal or at least applying to those who do not share it. The only way for a narrative in this discourse not to be hegemonic would be for it to be either truly universal and find a perspective that stems from nowhere and everywhere – a divine per- spective – or purely descriptive; the first being an impossibil- ity for fallible beings and the other not worth engaging with since it has nothing to say about how things should be structured or decided in a specific situation.

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hdl.handle.net/1765/40610
Erasmus Law Review
Erasmus Law Review
Erasmus School of Law

Ajevski, M. (2013). International Criminal Law and Constitutionalism. Erasmus Law Review, 6(1), 50–61. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/40610