This paper reports results of a natural field experiment on the dictator game where subjects are unaware that they are participating in an experiment. Three other experiments explore, step by step, how laboratory behavior of students relates to field behavior of a general population. In all experiments, subjects display an equally high amount of pro-social behavior, whether they are students or not, participate in a laboratory or not, or are aware of their participating in an experiment or not. This paper shows that there are settings where laboratory behavior of students is predictive for field behavior of a general population.

Altruism, Dictator game, External validity, Misdirected letter technique
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-013-9368-6, hdl.handle.net/1765/40969
ERIM Top-Core Articles
Experimental Economics
Erasmus Research Institute of Management

Stoop, J.T.R. (2014). From the lab to the field: envelopes, dictators and manners. Experimental Economics, 17(2), 304–313. doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9368-6