An important goal of risk-adjusted capitation payments (RACPs) to competitive community-rated health plansthat may differ in coverage and/or the organisation of delivering careis to reduce incentives for risk selection while maintaining incentives for efficiency. In most schemes, RACPs are simply based on the average observed costs in risk groups (in a prior year). We show that under this procedure, incentives for efficiency will not always be maintained: when identical risk types are concentrated in the same health plansdue to selection, specialisation or just coincidencecost savings can be captured by the RACPs and leak away from these plans.

capitation payments, efficiency, health insurance, risk adjustment,
The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice
Erasmus School of Health Policy & Management (ESHPM)

van Kleef, R.C, Beck, K, & Buchner, F. (2010). Risk-type concentration and efficiency incentives: A challenge for the risk adjustment formula. The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, 35(4), 503–520. doi:10.1057/gpp.2010.25