This article introduces the option to make individual access to excludable public benefits conditional on ascertainable efforts to limit claims. Contracts are situational when front-line staff are mandated to allow for differences in the ability to perform of their counterparts and to offer customized enabling facilities to improve capabilities. Degrees of freedom and transaction costs are controlled through political guidance in protocols, on the basis of apply-or-explain. Situational contracting reveals individual preference, reduces opportunism, furthers trust and induces open innovation. The article presents results of an early application in The Netherlands.

Asymmetrical info, Institutional design, Motivation analysis, Public management, Reciprocity
dx.doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2010.488866, hdl.handle.net/1765/64320
Public Management Review: an international journal of research and theory
Department of Public Administration

Wolfson, D.J. (2010). Situational contracting as a mode of Governance. Public Management Review: an international journal of research and theory, 12(6), 857–872. doi:10.1080/14719037.2010.488866