This paper provides a swift tour of auction theory and its applications. Among the questions it considers are: How much do bidders bid in commonly studied single-object auctions? How efficient are these auctions? How much revenue do they generate? Which single-object auction maximizes the seller's expected revenue? What is the best way to auction incentive contracts? And, how efficient and complex are multi-object auctions?

Auctioning incentive contracts, Efficiency, Equilibrium bidding, Multiple objects, Optimal auctions, Revenue equivalence
dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10645-006-9002-5, hdl.handle.net/1765/66118
De Economist
Erasmus School of Economics

Maasland, E, & Onderstal, S. (2006). Going, going, gone! A swift tour of auction theory and its applications. De Economist, 154(2), 197–249. doi:10.1007/s10645-006-9002-5