In defence of constructive empiricism: Maxwell's master argument and Aberrant theories
Journal for General Philosophy of Science , Volume 39 - Issue 1 p. 131- 156
Over the past years, in books and journals (this journal included), N. Maxwell launched a ferocious attack on B. C. van Fraassen's view of science called Constructive Empiricism (CE). This attack has been totally ignored. Must we conclude from this silence that no defence is possible and that a fortiori Maxwell has buried CE once and for all? Or is the attack too obviously flawed as not to merit exposure? A careful dissection of Maxwell's reasoning will make it clear that neither is the case. This dissection includes an analysis of Maxwell's 'aberrance-argument' (omnipresent in his many writings) for the claim that science implicitly and permanently accepts a substantial, metaphysical thesis about the universe, which then paves the way for his own metaphysical-realist hierarchy-view of science. This aberrance-claim, which Maxwell directs against a widely shared and harmful ideology of science called 'Standard Empiricism', generally has been ignored too, for more than a quarter of a century. Our conclusions will be that (i) Maxwell's attacks on CE can be beaten off, and (ii) his 'aberrance-arguments' do not establish what Maxwell believes they establish, but (iii) we can draw a number of valuable lessons from these attacks about the nature of science and of the libertarian nature of CE.
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Muller, F.A. (2008). In defence of constructive empiricism: Maxwell's master argument and Aberrant theories. Journal for General Philosophy of Science (Vol. 39, pp. 131–156). doi:10.1007/s10838-008-9065-x