We develop a model of R&D competition and collaboration in which individual firms carry out independent in-house research and also undertake joint research projects with other firms. We examine the impact of collaboration on in-house research and explore the circumstances under which a hybrid organization of R&D which combines the two is optimal for firms and society. We find that investments in independent research and in joint research are complementary. Firm profits are highest under a hybrid organization if the number of firms is small; otherwise they are highest with pure in-house research. However, social welfare is maximized under a hybrid organization of R&D in all cases. Our analysis also yields new results on the role of cooperative R&D. Non-cooperative firm decision making leads to more R&D and higher social welfare than fully cooperative decision making. However, bilateral cooperation in joint projects and non-cooperative decision making in in-house research yields the highest level of welfare in concentrated industries.
|cooperation, in-house R&D, joint R&D, oligopoly|
|Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets (jel L13), Management of Technological Innovation and R&D (jel O32)|
|Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series|
Goyal, S, Konovalov, A, & Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L. (2003). Hybrid R&D (No. TI 03-041/1). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6708