Multi-Store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing?
This paper develops a model for multi-store competition between firms. Using the fact that different firms have different outlets and produce horizontally differentiated goods, we obtain a pure strategy equilibrium where firms choose a different location for each outlet and firms' locations are interlaced. Moreover, generically, the subgame perfect equilibrium is unique and when the firms have an equal number of outlets, prices are independent of the number of outlets.
|hotelling, interlacing, multi-store competition|
|Household Behavior and Family Economics: General (jel D10), Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health (jel I18), Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification (jel Z13)|
|Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series|
Janssen, M.C.W, Karamychev, V.A, & van Reeven, P.A. (2004). Multi-Store Competition: Market Segmentation or Interlacing? (No. TI 03-033/1). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6711