This paper develops an economic argument relating auctions to high market prices. At the core of the argument is the claim that market competition and bidding in an auction should be analyzed as part of one game, where the pricing strategies in the market subgame depend on the bidding strategies during the auction.I show that the only equilibrium in the overall game that is consistent with the logic of forward induction is the one where firms bid an amount (almost) equal to the profits of the cooperative market outcome and follow a cooperative pricing strategy in the market game resulting in high prices.

auctions, market collusions
Regulation and Industrial Policy: General (jel L50)
hdl.handle.net/1765/6724
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series
Tinbergen Institute

Janssen, M.C.W. (2003). Auctions as Collusion Devices (No. TI 03-017/1). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6724