Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players
This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a society with many groups, where it is cheaper to connect within groups as compared to across groups, strategic play by individuals leads to a network architecture in which there is a core group which is entirely internally connected while all the other groups are entirely externally linked and hence completely fragmented. Since internal/within group links are cheaper to form, this implies that individual incentives may generate a significant waste of valuable social resources.
|heterogeneity, network formation, noncooperative games|
|Noncooperative Games (jel C72), Game Theory and Bargaining Theory: Other (jel C79)|
|Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series|
Galeotti, A, & Goyal, S. (2002). Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players (No. TI 02-069/1). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6803