This paper investigates whether transactions where the buyer (or the seller) always moves first, and the seller (or the buyer) always moves second in the exchange gives higher payoffs than exchanges in which it is randomly determined who moves first. We examine the effect of two treatment variables: Partners versus Strangers and fixed versus changing positions. We find that both with fixed and with changing positions, second movers take advantage of their position by exploiting the first mover by "not delivering" the demanded good. However, with fixed positions exploitation occurs significantly less while reciprocal exchanges happen more often. In spite of this, it turns out that with fixed positions payoffs are very unevenly distributed. Unequal payoff distributions occur both under Partners and Strangers, but they appear to be more extreme among Strangers.

exchange, experiments, partners, role assignment
Design of Experiments: General (jel C90), Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement (jel D63), Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks (jel L14)
hdl.handle.net/1765/6842
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series
Tinbergen Institute

van der Heijden, E.C.M, Nelissen, J.H.M, & Verbon, H.A.A. (2001). Should the Same Side of the Market always move first in a Transaction? An Experimental Study (No. TI 01-089/3). Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/6842