We examine bidding firms’ motives for disclosing a synergy forecast when announcing a merger or acquisition. Our sample consists of 1,990 M&A deals, of which 345 announce synergy estimates. Our results suggest that synergy disclosures serve to obtain a more favorable market reception for deals that would otherwise induce highly negative bidder announcement returns. After controlling for the endogeneity of the disclosure decision, synergy forecast disclosures result in approximately 5% higher bidder stock returns. The main deterrents of disclosing synergy values are lack of precise information on synergy values available to bidding-firm management, and shareholder litigation risk.

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hdl.handle.net/1765/76128
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), Erasmus University

Dutordoir, M., Roosenboom, P., & Teixeira de Vasconcelos, M. (2013). Synergy disclosures in mergers and acquisitions. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/76128