1999
The Morality of Aspiration: A Neglected Dimension of Law and Morality
Publication
Publication
Introduction
In The Morality of Law, Fuller introduces the distinction between the
morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, and applies it to problems
of jurisprudence. 1 In moral theory, both types of morality may be easily
associated (though never completely identified) with major philosophical
traditions such as utilitarianism and Kantianism on the one hand, and
Aristotelianism on the other. While in the 1960s and 1970s the focus of
moral philosophy was predominantly on duties and obligations, the recent
nee-Aristotelian revival has led. to renewed attention to concepts that
belong to the sphere of aspiration, such as virtues and ideals. In legal
theory, however, the sphere of aspiration has always been more marginal,
as most jurists tend to focus on legal rules and duties. In my view, we
should deplore this relative neglect because the idea of a morality of
aspiration is very fruitful in legal theory and, as a result of developments
in contemporary society, it is becoming even more relevant.
Additional Metadata | |
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hdl.handle.net/1765/77305 | |
Organisation | Erasmus School of Law |
van der Burg, W. (1999). The Morality of Aspiration: A Neglected Dimension of Law and Morality. In Rediscovering Fuller. Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (pp. 169–192). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/77305 |