Introduction
In The Morality of Law, Fuller introduces the distinction between the morality of duty and the morality of aspiration, and applies it to problems of jurisprudence. 1 In moral theory, both types of morality may be easily associated (though never completely identified) with major philosophical traditions such as utilitarianism and Kantianism on the one hand, and Aristotelianism on the other. While in the 1960s and 1970s the focus of moral philosophy was predominantly on duties and obligations, the recent nee-Aristotelian revival has led. to renewed attention to concepts that belong to the sphere of aspiration, such as virtues and ideals. In legal theory, however, the sphere of aspiration has always been more marginal, as most jurists tend to focus on legal rules and duties. In my view, we should deplore this relative neglect because the idea of a morality of aspiration is very fruitful in legal theory and, as a result of developments in contemporary society, it is becoming even more relevant.

hdl.handle.net/1765/77305
Erasmus School of Law

van der Burg, W. (1999). The Morality of Aspiration: A Neglected Dimension of Law and Morality. In Rediscovering Fuller. Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (pp. 169–192). Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/77305