Abstract

This survey addresses the question of whether formal legal enforcement crowds out or crowds in the amount of trust in a society. Based on a review of relevant empirical studies in the literature on macroeconomics, inter-firm cooperation and laboratory experiments, it can be concluded that find that formal legal mechanisms, especially formal contracts backed by a powerful authority, normally work as substitutes for trust, rather than complements, except when they are perceived as legitimate, or when there are no strong social norms of fairness (i.e. the population in a society is considerably heterogeneous), or when the environment

Additional Metadata
Keywords Crowding-out, Legal Rule, Contract Enforcement
Promotor M.G. Faure (Michael) , M. Bigoni (Maria) , A.M.I.B. Vandenberghe (Ann-Sophie)
Publisher Erasmus University Rotterdam
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/79271
Series EDLE - The European Doctorate in Law and Economics programme
Citation
Sun, H. (2015, December 14). Law, Informal Institutions and Trust. EDLE - The European Doctorate in Law and Economics programme. Erasmus University Rotterdam. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/79271

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