Ordinary Wrongdoing and Responsibility Worth Wanting
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy , Volume 2 - Issue 1 p. 67- 82
In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence—e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’-like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.
|disagreement, free will, moral monster, responsibility, weakness|
|European Journal of Analytic Philosophy|
|Organisation||Erasmus School of Philosophy|
Sie, M.M.S.K. (2005). Ordinary Wrongdoing and Responsibility Worth Wanting. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2(1), 67–82. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/8560