In this paper it is argued that we can have defensible attributions of responsibility without first answering the question whether determinism and free will are compatible. The key to such a defense is a focus on the fact that most actions for which we hold one another responsible are quite ordinary—trespassing traffic regulations, tardiness, or breaking a promise. As we will show, unlike actions that problematize our moral competence—e.g. akratic and ‘moral monster’-like ones—ordinary ‘wrong’ actions often disclose this competence. Hence, no counterfactual assumption is needed to establish that some of us are sometimes responsible for some of the actions we perform.

disagreement, free will, moral monster, responsibility, weakness
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
Erasmus School of Philosophy

Sie, M.M.S.K. (2005). Ordinary Wrongdoing and Responsibility Worth Wanting. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2(1), 67–82. Retrieved from