This paper posits three phases in EU financial market regulation. First, for the 1990s, established scholarship suggests leadership by public actors in the context of development of the single market and relations with the USA. We adopt this analysis, characterising it as 'public-private' regulation. Second, in the new millennium regulation shifted towards 'private-public', with regulators paying more attention to the demands of large financial firms. This tendency is explored through a critical study of 'technical' decision-making by EU regulators, focusing upon the Committee of European Securities Regulators and rating credit agencies. Third, as from 2010 EU policy-makers react to the spillover of the financial crisis from markets to member states, some limits to private-public governance have been underlined. The paper concludes with a discussion of positions taken by the European Parliament, moderating claims made for 'technical' rule-making and opening up the possibility of wider intellectual and policy debate.

Committee of European securities regulators, Credit rating agencies, Delegation under article 290 TFEU, European securities and markets authority, Financial regulation, Private-public
dx.doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2011.566333, hdl.handle.net/1765/86380
Journal of European Integration
Erasmus School of Law

Dorn, N. (2012). Render unto caesar: EU financial market regulation meets political accountability. Journal of European Integration, 34(3), 205–221. doi:10.1080/07036337.2011.566333