We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417–57, 2014) is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s (in Proc Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable ingredient of any theorizing about fair division problems and allocative justice.
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| , , , , | |
| doi.org/10.1007/s11229-015-0967-y, hdl.handle.net/1765/88430 | |
| Synthese | |
| Organisation | Erasmus School of Philosophy |
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Heilmann, C., & Wintein, S. (2015). How to be fairer. Synthese, 1–25. doi:10.1007/s11229-015-0967-y |
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