When people or organizations engage in voluntary exchange, it is crucial how much information either side of a deal disposes of. The common theme in the chapters of this book is asymmetric information, which can create an imbalance of power between the two parties involved in a transaction. The author describes a variety of instruments that the informationally disadvantaged organizations may use to overcome the resulting adverse selection and moral hazard problems. In doing so, he deviates from the neoclassical assumption of selfishness and introduces bounds to individual rationality in his models. The topics that are investigated range from tax evasion to innovative personnel policies.

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A.J. Dur (Robert) , J. Delfgaauw (Josse)
Erasmus University Rotterdam
Tinbergen Instituut Research Series
Erasmus School of Economics

Schmittdiel, H. (2016, October 6). Paid to Quit, Cheat, and Confess (No. 667). Tinbergen Instituut Research Series. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/93508