Presentism and black holes
European Journal for Philosophy of Science , Volume 7 - Issue 1
In a recent publication in the European Journal for Philosophy of Science (Romero and Pérez, European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4, 293–308, 2014), Romero and Pérez claim to reveal new trouble for the already difficult life of presentism in relativistic spacetimes. Their argument purports to demonstrate the impossibility of postulating a viable present in the presence of black holes, in particular the Schwarzschild geometries. I argue that their argument is flawed, and that the Schwarzschild geometries they consider offer no novel threats to presentism. However, if we consider more general black holes, different and more potent threats may be lurking in the dark. I discuss these threats and sketch how a presentist may respond, thus painting a more balanced picture of the way the existence of black holes might impact presentist metaphysics. At present there is no decisive verdict from black holes, but it turns out a close scrutiny of the developments in the relevant physics will be needed to see whether their import will remain so inconclusive.
|, , ,
|European Journal for Philosophy of Science
|Erasmus School of Philosophy
Sengers, G. (Geurt). (2017). Presentism and black holes. European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 7(1). doi:10.1007/s13194-015-0135-8