In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.

Additional Metadata
Keywords Board effectiveness, Director elections, Securities and Exchange Commission, Shareholder voting
Persistent URL dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001, hdl.handle.net/1765/97845
Journal Finance Research Letters
Citation
Akyol, A, Raff, K, & Verwijmeren, P. (2017). The elimination of broker voting in director elections. Finance Research Letters, 21, 34–39. doi:10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001