2017-05-01
The elimination of broker voting in director elections
Publication
Publication
Finance Research Letters , Volume 21 p. 34- 39
In 2009, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reformed shareholder voting by eliminating uninstructed broker voting in director elections. We use this reform as a quasi-natural experiment to assess the value of shareholder empowerment. Using different control groups and various cross-sectional tests, we find that the reform did not increase average equity values.
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| doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001, hdl.handle.net/1765/97845 | |
| ERIM Top-Core Articles | |
| Finance Research Letters | |
| Organisation | Department of Finance |
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Akyol, A., Raff, K., & Verwijmeren, P. (2017). The elimination of broker voting in director elections. Finance Research Letters, 21, 34–39. doi:10.1016/j.frl.2017.02.001 |
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