Disclosure Checklists and Auditors’ Judgments of Aggressive Accounting
This study investigates if auditors who feel accountable to management (as opposed to the audit committee) are more susceptible to pro-client bias after using a disclosure checklist. We theorize that the use of a disclosure checklist, even though it is uninformative about the aggressiveness of the accounting methods used, can influence auditors’ judgments of the acceptability of aggressive reporting by inducing a less critical state of mind. We propose that this less critical state of mind is reflected in higher levels of pro-client bias, particularly when management is the appointing party. Our experimental data for two cases, obtained from experienced auditors working at a Big Four audit firm, support this prediction. Our findings imply that threats to auditor independence are more subtle than has often been assumed.
|Persistent URL||dx.doi.org/10.1080/09638180.2017.1304228, hdl.handle.net/1765/98813|
|Journal||The European Accounting Review|
|Note||No subscription; no full text available yet|
van Rinsum, M, Maas, V.S, & Stolker, D. (David). (2017). Disclosure Checklists and Auditors’ Judgments of Aggressive Accounting. The European Accounting Review, 1–17. doi:10.1080/09638180.2017.1304228