In this paper, we introduce and analyze resource location games. We show core nonemptiness by providing a set of intuitive core allocations, called Resource-Profit allocations. In addition, we present a sufficient condition for which the core and the set of Resource- Profit allocations coincide. Finally, we provide an example showing that when the sufficient condition is not satisfied, the coincidence is not guaranteed.

Additional Metadata
Keywords cooperative game, core, resource-profit allocations, reallocation of resources
Persistent URL hdl.handle.net/1765/115180
Series Econometric Institute Research Papers
Citation
Schlicher, L.P.J, Musegaas, M, & Westerink-Duijzer, L.E. (2019). Resource location games (No. EI2019-05). Econometric Institute Research Papers. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/115180