We model the emergence of organization forms in a game between prospective entrepreneurs. Complementary roles arise endogenously in a way that admits a stable assignment of workers to firms. This contrasts with existing work on job matching, where stability typically requires workers to be substitutes. Our approach demonstrates that the labor market selection of entrepreneurs and their profit-maximizing choices lead to specific technologies in which certain workers are substitutes and others are complements. We give a simple characterization of equilibrium firm memberships and organizations. We show that payoffs in our non-cooperative solution lie in the core of the corresponding cooperative game, and can be obtained in a decentralized process that reduces information and planning requirements for the entrepreneur.

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Tinbergen Institute
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper Series
Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute
Tinbergen Institute

Roessler, C., & Koellinger, P. (2009). Firm Formation with Complementarities: The Role of the Entrepreneur (No. TI 09-003/3). Discussion paper / Tinbergen Institute. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/14740