Two-sided markets are composed of platform owners and two distinct user networks that either buy or sell applications for the platform. The authors focus on multihoming-the choice of an agent in a user network to use more than one platform. In the context of the video game console industry, they examine the conditions affecting seller-level multihoming decisions on a given platform. Furthermore, they investigate how platform-level multihoming of applications affects the sales of the platform. The authors show that increased platform-level multihoming of applications hurts platform sales, a finding consistent with literature on brand differentiation, but they also show that this effect vanishes as platforms mature or gain market share. The authors find that platform-level multihoming of applications affects platform sales more strongly than the number of applications. Furthermore, among mature platforms, an increasing market share leads to more seller-level multihoming, while among nascent platforms, seller-level multihoming decreases as platform market share increases. These findings prompt scholars to look beyond network size in analyzing two-sided markets and provide guidance to both (application) sellers and platform owners.

Entertainment markets, Indirect network effects, Multihoming, Two-sided markets, Video game industry
hdl.handle.net/1765/92285
Journal of Marketing
Erasmus School of Economics

Schwartz-Landsman, V, & Stremersch, S. (2011). Multihoming in two-sided markets: An empirical inquiry in the video game console industry. Journal of Marketing, 75(6), 39–54. Retrieved from http://hdl.handle.net/1765/92285